NOT THAT THIS MATTERS – BECAUSE WE WOULDN'T
SUPPORT ITS USE EITHER WAY – BUT TORTUE ISN'T EVEN EFFECTIVE
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush launched an aggressive campaign to secure this nation, authorizing a number of activities that went far beyond the parameters of traditional law enforcement. Specifically, the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program implemented by the CIA was a global counter-terrorism effort tasked with disrupting al-Qaeda and protecting the United States against another large-scale domestic attack.
In 2014, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a 528-page executive summary of its study of this program (the entire classified report, approved in 2012, is over 6,700 pages). In part, the Committee found that the interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers, and that the conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had represented.
In response to the Senate report, the CIA acknowledged that the agency "failed to perform a comprehensive and independent analysis on the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation techniques." But they pushed back on other findings: "The Agency disagrees with the study's unqualified assertions that the overall detention and interrogation program did not produce unique intelligence that led terrorist plots to be disrupted, terrorists to be captured, or lives to be saved."
Maybe torture did produce some "unique intelligence" but certainly not every time. In fact, the most useful intel was gained when detainees were questioned using non-coercive techniques. We warn you, what you are about to read from the Senate report is distressing....
Other detainees, including Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, provided false information after tortuous interrogation. "Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as evolving into a 'series of near drownings.'" The report also found that the CIA waterboarded KSM at least 183 times, and that KSM's reporting included "significant fabricated information."
In the CIA's response to the Senate report, CIA Director John Brennan – who was Director from March 8, 2013 - January 20, 2017 – wrote, “The Agency takes no position on whether intelligence obtained from detainees who were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques could have been obtained through other means or from other individuals. The answer to this question is and will forever remain unknowable."
He continued, "After reviewing the Committee Study and the comments of the Agency review team, and as I indicated at the outset of this memorandum, I personally remain firm in my belief that enhanced interrogation techniques are an inappropriate method for obtaining intelligence. Moreover, it is my resolute intention never to allow any Agency officer to participate in any interrogation activity in which enhanced interrogation techniques would be employed."
He's hardly alone. Forty-two (42) retired generals and admirals of the U.S. Armed Forces sent a letter to the 2016 presidential candidates (read the entire letter here). Much of the letter reflected on our nation's values: "We know from experience that U.S. national security policies are most effective when they uphold our nation’s core ideals...Torture violates our core values as a nation. Our greatest strength is our commitment to the rule of law and to the principles embedded in our Constitution. Our servicemen and women need to know that our leaders do not condone torture of any kind...George Washington admonished his soldiers that anyone engaging in torture 'bring[s] shame, disgrace and ruin to themselves and their country.' Ronald Reagan pressed the Senate to ratify the Convention Against Torture, stating that the United States must clearly express her will to 'bring an end to the abhorrent practice of torture.'"
But the generals and admirals went a step further:
"Torture is unnecessary. Based on our experience – and that of our nation’s top interrogators, backed by countless studies – we know that lawful, rapport-based interrogation techniques are the most effective way to elicit actionable intelligence. But torture is actually worse than unnecessary; it is counterproductive and undermines our national security. It increases the risks to our troops, hinders cooperation with allies, alienates populations whose support the United States needs in the struggle against terrorism, and provides a propaganda tool for extremists who wish to do us harm."
Evidence:
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program." 13 Dec 2012
Michael Hayden. "Playing to the Edge." New York: Penguin Press. 2016
George Santayana. "The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress." Vol. I, Reason in Common Sense. 1905-1906
Central Intelligence Agency. "Response to the SSCI Study on the Former Detention and Interrogation Program." June 2013
"Foreign authorities captured Hassan Ghul in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. After his identity was confirmed in January 2004, Ghul was rendered from U.S. military custody to CIA custody at Detention Site COBALT. The detention site interrogators, who, according to CIA records, did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, sent at least 21 intelligence reports to CIA Headquarters based on their debriefings of Hassan Ghul from the two days he spent at the facility. CIA records indicate that the most accurate CIA detainee reporting on the facilitator who led to Usama bin Laden (UBL) was acquired from Hassan Ghul - prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
During this same period, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Ghul provided information related to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Faraj al-Libi (including his role in delivering messages from UBL), Jaffar al-Tayyar, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Hamza Rabi'a, Shaik Sa'id al-Masri, Sharif al-Masri, Abu 'Abd al-Rahman al-Najdi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and numerous other al-Qaeda operatives. He also provided information on the locations, movements, operational security, and training of al-Qaeda leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as on the visits of other leaders and operatives to Shkai. Ghul's reporting on Shkai, which was included in at least 16 of the 21 intelligence reports, confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai valley served as al-Qaeda command and control center after the group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.
Notwithstanding these facts, in March 2005, the CIA represented to the Department of Justice that Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai was acquired '"after" the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. After two days of questioning at Detention Site COBALT and the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports, Ghul was transferred to Detention Site BLACK. According to CIA records, upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" with plans to lower his hands after two hours. The CIA interrogators at the detention site then requested to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, writing: "[the] interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the initial contact, that his al-Qaeda briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift [Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these increased [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner.
CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day. Following 59 hours of sleep deprivation, Hassan Ghul experienced hallucinations, but was told by a psychologist that his reactions were "consistent with what many others experience in his condition," and that he should calm himself by telling himself his experiences are normal and will subside when he decides to be truthful. The sleep deprivation, as well as other enhanced interrogations, continued, as did Ghul's hallucinations.'' Ghul also complained of back pain and asked to see a doctor, but interrogators responded that the "pain was normal, and would stop when [Ghul] was confirmed as telling the truth." A cable states that "interrogators told [Ghul] they did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete and truthful information. A CIA physician assistant later observed that Hassan Ghul was experiencing "notable physiological fatigue," including "abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, 'heaviness' and mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are secondary to his hanging position and extreme degree of sleep deprivation," but that Ghul was clinically stable and had "essentially normal vital signs," despite an "occasional premature heart beat" that the cable linked to Ghul's fatigue.
Throughout this period, Ghul provided no actionable threat information, and much of his reporting on the al-Qaeda presence in Shkai was repetitive of his reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Ghul also provided no other information of substance on UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti."
In a staggering disconnect, in his book Playing to the Edge Michael Hayden (CIA Director from May 30, 2006 – February 12, 2009) recounts a story of a professional relationship he had with a CIA interrogator who interrogated Khalid Shaykh Mohammad. In his account, this interrogator had "built up a personal relationship with KSM." According to this interrogator, "KSM referred to him as Amir, a term of respect for the man who had waterboarded him and made him feel, over and over again, as though he was drowning. The interrogation techniques – in KSM's case, especially sleep deprivation – had pushed him into what the interrogators called a zone of cooperation from his previous zone of defiance and after that, KSM's questioning resembled more an interview than an interrogation. The information we got from him and others was incredibly valuable."
Wow! It sounds like KSM was at Disney World hanging out with his buddies!
We have tons of respect for General Hayden, and deeply appreciate his four-plus decades of service to this country. But still...If anyone is going to defend these techniques, please at least have the guts to be honest about what they truly are, and how and why they were used.
There are two other highly concerning parts of General Hayden's book. Predictably, he was aghast that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was going to release a report on the CIA's detention and interrogation program, which is understandable because he would certainly be right in the thick of things. However, what deeply disturbs us are two specific passages:
(1) "I've since reflected on the Feinstein report and what lessons to draw from it. One positive take-away was the clear need to brief Congress fully and contemporaneously on sensitive activity...I'm close to drawing a second, darker conclusion too. Be careful what you tell these people. Some are less interested in honest dialogue than listening to rebut and accuse and discredit." General, regardless of what you think of members of Congress, it is not up to you – or anyone, for that matter – to decide what the CIA does and does not get to tell them. In fact, that attitude is what got you all into this mess in the first place. Even though the Constitution grants no formal congressional oversight power, it is implied in Congress’s vast breadth of enumerated powers. Checks and balances are vital to our democracy.
(2) "Why the report? CIA was out of the interrogation business. It wasn't going back." Sir, that is a shockingly naïve statement for a retired United States Air Force four-star general and former Director of the National Security Agency. General Hayden, we would like to introduce you to Donald Trump. Those who cannot remember the past <or are content to sweep it under the rug> are condemned to repeat it.