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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

In a panicked response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 combined 17 national security-related agencies from across five departments – creating a super-duper-uber agency:  The Department of Homeland Security. 

Problem is, each of these agencies were already subject to oversight by numerous congressional committees and subcommittees.  As a result, DHS oversight has been convoluted, confusing, and ineffective from the very start.  This has not only created chaos and caused major turf wars, but it also has wasted massive time and resources.  The entire thing is just a hot mess.  

 

In the 9/11 Commission Report, it was recommended that Congress “create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security.”  Read the entire report here.  This has not happened, however, and oversight is shared among 92 – 92! – committees and subcommittees. 

There is a case to be made for dismantling the Department of Homeland Security entirely, but we believe a better approach would be to reorganize and reimagine the agency.

One of the most critical things we should do is streamline the oversight of the agency.  We recommend two principal points of oversight: The Homeland Security Committee in the House of Representatives and the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in the Senate. 

Until then, this remains beyond absurd and ridiculously inefficient.  Inefficient is not even the right word – we need an entirely new word for what this is.  It is imperative that we reorganize this mess and use our resources more effectively. 

 

Which is the perfect job for Operation Overhaul!  We know that at times putting the genie back in the bottle sounds overwhelming – if not impossible – but it can absolutely be done.  Operation Overhaul is a total restructure of the United States government.  This policy reduces costs, maximizes value, and improves performance by strengthening operational strategies – building an effective organizational structure and demanding accountability.  This will remove redundancy, unlock hidden value by eliminating waste, establish clear channels of reporting and responsibility, and get the most out of government employees.  It's awesome!   

 

 

 

 

 

We don't have a second to waste.  The lack of organization at DHS has allowed outside influences to essentially do whatever the heck they want.  After 9/11 the government authorized billions of dollars to close security gaps, sending contractors, consultants, lobbyists, academics, bureaucrats and everyone in between into an absolute frenzy.  Hundreds of billions was spent as oversight fell through the cracks.  Essentially, we threw a bunch of money at a million different things to see what would stick.  Unfortunately, A LOT didn't.  

 

As a result of all this nonsense, from day one – big surprise – DHS has been on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) High Risk List (the GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress).  To get us started, here are the GAO's ongoing recommendations:

Acquisitions

DHS’s efforts to improve the performance of its major acquisition programs are noteworthy, but the programs continue to face challenges. Issues with staffing, funding, and defining the department’s requirements (what the department needs from the tools and assets it plans to acquire) increase the likelihood that major acquisition projects will:

  1. Cost more than expected – reducing DHS’s buying power; and,

  2. Take longer to complete than expected – making frontline employees wait for new capabilities.
     

There can be valid reasons for cost growth or schedule delays, such as a program pursuing expanded capabilities to meet evolving threats. Other reasons for cost growth and schedule slips are more troubling, such as initial cost estimates that were not comprehensive and poorly defined requirements.

Human Capital

DHS has made improvements in this area but has considerable work ahead. For example, DHS is implementing a human capital strategic plan and structured workforce planning. This should better prepare DHS to fill gaps in its workforce. However, Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework data – a subset of the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey – indicate that DHS employee morale has remained low relative to other government agencies. DHS has developed plans for addressing this and – after a five-year period of declining scores – has improved its scores in 2016 and 2017. DHS needs to continue to focus on improving employee morale though continued emphasis on employee engagement, among other efforts.

Financial Management

DHS is statutorily required to obtain audit opinions on both its financial statements and its internal control over financial reporting.  DHS received a clean audit opinion on its financial statements for 5 consecutive years – fiscal years 2013 through 2017.  However, there are significant issues with DHS’s internal controls over financial reporting, information technology and financial system functionality, and instances of non-compliance with laws and regulations. These deficiencies hamper DHS’s ability to provide reasonable assurance that its financial reporting is reliable and the department is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  In addition, much work remains to modernize components' financial management systems. Without sound controls and systems, DHS faces long-term challenges in obtaining a clean audit opinion on internal controls over financial reporting, and ensuring its financial management systems generate reliable, useful, and timely information to inform the department’s day-to-day decision making.

IT

In 2014, DHS established and institutionalized a robust process for reviewing each of its IT investment portfolios across the entire department, to identify potentially duplicative investments and determine the most efficient allocation of resources within each portfolio. However, for the past 2 fiscal years, DHS has not fully sustained these investment management practices, which may limit its ability to identify potentially duplicative investments and consolidation opportunities department-wide.

 

In 2015, DHS also shifted its IT focus from acquiring assets to acquiring services. Now, DHS’s IT work includes acting as a service broker (i.e., an intermediary between the purchaser of a service and the seller of that service). According to DHS officials, this change requires a major transition in the skill sets of DHS’s IT workforce, as well as the hiring, training, and managing of staff with those new skill sets. The department initiated a workforce planning initiative – distinct from the initiative mentioned above – to specifically identify the skills needed to support this paradigm shift and address any gaps. According to DHS officials, they plan to complete this initiative in 2019.

Additionally, DHS has taken steps to enhance its information security program but has continued to experience security weaknesses. According to the department’s financial statement auditor, DHS had made progress in correcting its prior year IT security weaknesses. However, in November 2014 – for the 14th consecutive year – the auditor designated deficiencies in IT security controls over financial systems as a weakness.

Evidence:

The 9/11 Commission.  "The 9/11 Commission Report."  22 July 2004

United States.  Government Accountability Office.  "DHS Management - High Risk Issue."  6 Oct 2018

United States.  Government Accountability Office.  "High Risk Issue: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas."  March 2019

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