Counterinsurgency
Read more about Foreign Internal Defense here.
Read the Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency here.
Read FM 3-24 MCWP 3-02, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies here.
Counterinsurgency is the "comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes."
1787 supports the current United States guidelines for Counterinsurgency.
* The text below is taken directly from the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Read the entire guide here.
"Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. As such, it is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective.
"Insurgency is not always conducted by a single group with a centralized, military-style command structure, but may involve a complex matrix of different actors with various aims, loosely connected in dynamic and non-hierarchical networks. To be successful, insurgencies require charismatic leadership, supporters, recruits, supplies, safe havens and funding (often from illicit activities). They only need the active support of a few enabling individuals, but the passive acquiescence of a large proportion of the contested population will give a higher probability of success."
"This is best achieved when the political cause of the insurgency has strong appeal, manipulating religious, tribal or local identity to exploit common societal grievances or needs. Insurgents seek to gain control of populations through a combination of persuasion, subversion and coercion while using guerrilla tactics to offset the strengths of government security forces. Their intent is usually to protract the struggle, exhaust the government and win sufficient popular support to force capitulation or political accommodation. Consequently, insurgencies evolve through a series of stages, though the progression and outcome will be different in almost every case."
"Counterinsurgency (COIN) is the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. Unlike conventional warfare, non-military means are often the most effective elements, with military forces playing an enabling role."
"COIN is an extremely complex undertaking, which demands of policy makers a detailed understanding of their own specialist field, but also a broad knowledge of a wide variety of related disciplines. COIN approaches must be adaptable and agile. Strategies will usually be focused primarily on the population rather than the enemy and will seek to reinforce the legitimacy of the affected government while reducing insurgent influence. This can often only be achieved in concert with political reform to improve the quality of governance and address underlying grievances, many of which may be legitimate."
Since U.S. COIN campaigns will normally involve engagement in support of a foreign government (either independently or as part of a coalition), success will often depend on the willingness of that government to undertake the necessary political changes. However great its know-how and enthusiasm, an outside actor can never fully compensate for lack of will, incapacity or counter-productive behavior on the part of the supported government."
This guide employs a COIN model that comprises four functions:
The political function is the key function, providing a framework of political reconciliation, and reform of governance around which all other COIN activities are organized. In general, a COIN strategy is only as good as the political plan at its heart.
The economic function seeks to provide essential services and stimulate long term economic growth, thereby generating confidence in the government while at the same time reducing the pool of frustrated, unemployed young men and women from which insurgents can readily recruit.
The security function is an enabler for the other functions and involves development not just of the affected nation’s military force, but its whole security sector, including the related legal framework, civilian oversight mechanisms and judicial system. Establishing security is not a precursor to economic and governance activity: rather security, economic and governance activity must be developed in parallel.
The information function comprises intelligence (required to gain understanding), and influence (to promote the affected government’s cause). It is essential that the influence campaign is in tune with the strategic narrative, resonates with the relevant audiences, is based on genuine resolve by the affected government and that physical actions match. What makes COIN different from other stabilization and humanitarian tasks is that both elements of the information function will be conducted in stark competition with the insurgents’ own information functions.
"These four functions contribute to the overall objective of enabling the affected government to establish control, consolidating and then transitioning it from intervening forces to national forces and from military to civil institutions. The imperative to achieve synergy among political, security, economic and information activities demands unity of effort among all participants (the affected government, U.S. government agencies and coalition partners)."
"This is best achieved through an integrated approach to assessment and planning. A common interagency assessment of the insurgency establishes a deep and shared understanding of the cultural, ideological, religious, demographic and geographical factors that affect the insurgency. Such understanding provides the foundation for policy formulation when the risks and costs of intervention are weighed against U.S. interests in determining whether to become involved and what form that involvement should take."
"This decision should not be taken lightly; historically COIN campaigns have almost always been more costly, more protracted and more difficult than first anticipated. Much will hinge on the degree to which policy makers consider the affected government to be receptive to assistance, advice and reform; it is folly to intervene unless there is a reasonable likelihood of cooperation. If the USG does decide to become involved, then policy makers should seek a careful balance which employs the most appropriate, most indirect and least intrusive form of intervention yet still gives a high probability of achieving the necessary effect."
"The sovereignty of the affected government must be maintained and too high a U.S. profile may be counter-productive (historically, some of the most successful U.S. engagements have been indirect and low key). Once U.S. assistance is committed, a COIN strategy must be devised, ideally in collaboration with the affected government and other coalition partners, since their early inclusion can help mitigate the effects of operational level differences in goals, capabilities and culture. Detailed, integrated planning then follows and a process of continuous monitoring, evaluation and assessment is used to measure progress and identify where changes in approach are necessary to achieve success."
"Success in COIN can be difficult to define, but improved governance will usually bring about marginalization of the insurgents to the point at which they are destroyed, co-opted or reduced to irrelevance in numbers and capability. U.S. intervention may cease when success is assured but before it is actually achieved. Ultimately, the desired end state is a government that is seen as legitimate, controlling social, political, economic and security institutions that meet the population’s needs, including adequate mechanisms to address the grievances that may have fueled support of the insurgency."
Evidence:
United States. Department of Defense. "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms." November 2018
United States. "Counterinsurgency." Joint Publication 3-24. 25 Apr 2018
United States. "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide." January 2009